Using recently developed indices of fractionalization and polarization, we analyze the direct and indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income inequality and on welfare programs across US states. We find strong evidence (1) that there is a positive relationship between ethnic and religious polarization and income inequality and an inverse-U shaped relationship between ethnic and religious fractionalization and income inequality; and (2) that there is a negative relationship between ethnic and religious polarization and monthly welfare payments under the AFDC/TANF scheme, and a U-shaped relationship between ethnic and religious fractionalization and the AFDC/TANF payments.
Introduction
Several empirical studies, based on cross country regressions, such as, Alesina et al. (2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that ethnic and religious heterogeneity generate conflicts leading to poor quality of institutions, poorly designed policies and poor growth performances. Alesina et al. (2003) , for example, measure heterogeneity by using a fractionalization index (FI) calculated as where ij n is the population share of group j in country i. The fractionalization index gives us the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to two different ethnic or religious groups. It reaches a maximum if every individual in a country belongs to a different ethnic or religious group. Alesina et al. (2003) find that going from complete ethnic homogeneity to complete ethnic heterogeneity decreases the growth rate of income by almost 2 percentage points. Reynal-Querol (2000, 2005) , on the other hand, use a polarization index (PI) to measure heterogeneity: PI is an index that measures the distance of any distribution of ethnic and religious groups from the situation that leads to the maximum conflict. The closer is the distribution of religious and ethnic groups in a country the higher is the PI. In a country with three ethnic or religious groups distributed with percentages 45, 45 and 10, the index and hence the likelihood of conflict is higher than with the percentages 34, 33 and 33 or with 90, 10, 0 (Reynal-Querol and Montalvo 2000, and Reynal-Querol 2005) . In contrast to FI, PI reaches a maximum when there are two religious or ethnic groups of equal size in a country. They find that going from complete homogeneity to complete heterogeneity decreases the growth rate of income by almost 1 percentage point.
Ethnic and religious heterogeneity not only affect the growth rate of income, they also affect income inequality both directly and indirectly. First, as Glaeser (2005) argues, ethnic heterogeneity causes skill inequality. "Skill inequality seems to come mostly from juxtaposition of ethnic groups with different educational traditions ... (Glaeser 2005, 6 )" Protestant churches, for example, as opposed to Catholic church, traditionally encourage education to increase familiarity with the Bible (Glaeser 2005) . Second, ethnic heterogeneity limits the tendency to redistribute income. According to Alesina and Glaeser (2004) , this is because individuals who belong to one ethnic group are less willing to support redistribution helping other ethnic groups.
The members of different ethnic groups simply view one another as direct competitors for scarce economic resources Kluegel 1993, Bobo and Hutchings 1996) .
There are several empirical studies which investigate the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on redistribution channels using micro data. Luttmer (2001) , for example, uses survey data to investigate the determinants of individual support for welfare programs in US and finds strong empirical evidence showing a clear pattern of ethnic group loyalty. He finds that, an additional black welfare recipient reduces support for welfare by non-black respondents but has little effect on black respondents. Conversely, an additional non-black welfare recipient reduces black support for welfare but has little effect on non-black support. Again using survey data, Okten and Osili (2004) investigate the determinants of contributions in Indonesia to community organizations, another important redistribution channel, and find similar results. They find that households are less likely to contribute to community organizations if they belong to a nonmajority group. Their results partially support Alesina and La Ferrara's (2000) hypothesis that the members of the non-majority ethnic group derive positive utility from interacting with the members of the same ethnic group and negative utility from interacting with the members of the majority ethnic group. Among the few studies using macro data, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find that ethnic fractionalization reduces support for welfare programs across countries.
Although the above mentioned studies present persuasive evidence regarding the effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on redistribution of income and channels of redistribution, to our knowledge there are no studies attempting to find the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income inequality. In other words, there are not any studies attempting to answer such questions as: how many percentage points of the difference in Gini coefficients between two countries or two states are explained by ethnic and religious heterogeneity?
In this study, we first analyze the direct effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income inequality, using both of the aforesaid polarization and fractionalization indices and data for 50 US states. As Bobo and Hutchings (1996) fractionalization is equal to 0.50 (respectively, 0.63).
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data on ethnic and religious heterogeneity as well as on the control variables. Section 3 presents the results of the SUR estimation and discusses the direct and indirect effects which ethnic and religious heterogeneity have on income inequality. Section 4 concludes.
Data
The data we use to calculate the ethnic polarization and fractionalization indices Tanzi (1995) argues that, corruption is a factor distorting the redistributive role of government. Since only the better connected individuals get the most profitable government projects, it is less likely that the the number of government officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. The data are from the Justice Department's "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section". These data are used by several studies such as Goel and Rich (1989) , Fisman and Gatti (2002) , Fredriksson, List and Millimet (2003) and Glaeser and Saks (2004) to measure corruption across states. The summary statistics for all of these variables are given in Table 3 .
Results

Polarization and Inequality: Direct Effects
Our basic model is as follows:
Gini since it allows for the error terms to be correlated across periods (Alesina et al. 2004, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) . We first formulate a separate regression for each period, then constrain government is able to improve the distribution of income the more corruption there is. In other words, "the benefits from corruption are likely to accrue to the better connected individuals … who belong mostly to high income groups" (Gupta et. al. 2002, 23) . According to Jonston (1989) , corruption favors the 'haves' rather than the 'have nots' particularly if the stakes are large.
the coefficients to be equal across periods and estimate the resulting system by generalized least squares (GLS). If the error terms are not correlated there is no payoff to GLS estimation-GLS is then simply equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS). The greater the correlation of the error terms, the greater the efficiency gain accruing to GLS (Greene 2003) . In our regressions, the correlation coefficient of the error terms across periods is higher than 0.70.
2
The results of the SUR estimation for the individual effects of ethnic and religious polarization on income inequality are given in the first two columns of Table 4 . The estimated coefficients of EPI and RPI are both positive and significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels respectively, indicating a strong positive relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and income inequality. As the results given in Table 4 
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Fractionalization and Inequality: Direct Effects
As mentioned earlier, FI increases with the number of groups. On the other hand, according to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) , ethnic and religious fractionalization do not necessarily increase social conflict: we are, in fact less likely to observe social conflict in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries; increases in heterogeneity, after some point, decrease the effect of an individual ethnic or religious group on redistribution. If this is indeed the case, we should see an inverse-U shaped relationship between the fractionalization indices and the Gini coefficient and there should be an inequality maximizing level of fractionalization.
To capture the presence of such a relationship we modify our basic model as follows:
Gini s,t2 = Intercept t2 + β 1 EFI/RFI s,t1 + β 2 EFI/RFI 2 s,t2 + β 3 X s,t2 + ε s,t2 .
The results of the SUR estimation for the individual effects of ethnic and religious fractionalization on income inequality are given in the first two columns of higher the percentage of female headed families, and the higher the percentage of the population over 65, the higher is the income inequality (Wu, Perloff, and Golan 2005) . GSP Growth has an equalizing effect while Corruption tends to increase the income inequality (Li et al. 2000, and Gupta et al. 2002) . Among the government policy variables, only the coefficient of AFDC/TANF is significant. We find that AFDC/TANF payments decrease the Gini coefficient.
4
Fractionalization, Polarization, and Inequality: Indirect Effects
One of the reasons why ethnic and religious heterogeneity affect income distribution is that they affect the channels of redistribution such as welfare programs. Using data on AFDC/TANF payments for 50 US states, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find a negative relationship between the percentage of the black population in a state and the level of AFDC/TANF payments, and they conclude that ethnically heterogeneous states of the south in 3 We do not report the estimated coefficients of EPI 2 and RPI 2 since they are not statistically significant in any specification. 4 Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2005) do not find a significant relationship between the AFDC/TANF payments and income inequality.
US are much less generous than their more homogeneous counterparts. As Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue, the AFDC/TANF is perhaps the largest welfare scheme in US. In our regressions we find a negative relationship between the AFDC/TANF payments and the Gini coefficient which is significant at the 5 percent, sometimes 1 percent level, indicating that the program is in fact a successful redistribution channel. It now becomes natural to ask if the fractionalization and the polarization affect the AFDC/TANF payments as they affect the Gini coefficient. The results of the SUR estimation are given in Table 6 and Table7.
Regarding polarization, the estimated coefficients of EPI and RPI are negative and significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels respectively, although the estimated coefficient of RPI loses its significance when we use EPI and RPI together. Alesina and
Glaeser (2004) between Utah and Louisiana is explained by different degrees of religious polarization. As for fractionalization, the estimated coefficients of EFI and RFI are negative and significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels respectively; and the estimated coefficients of EFI 2 and RFI 2 are positive an significant at 1 percent and 10 percent levels respectively, although the coefficients of RFI and RFI 2 lose their significance when we use both ethnic and religious fractionalization indices at the same time. In other words, we find U-shaped relationships of ethnic and religious fractionalization with AFDC/TANF payments. As the results given in Table 7 indicate, monthly AFDC/TANF payment is minimized when EFI=0.50 and it is minimized when RFI=0.63 which again fall in the middle-part of the range of observed values of EFI (0.03; 0.90) and RFI (0.18; 0.87).
5 Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the negative relationships between the polarization indices and the AFDC/TANF payments. The U-shaped relationships between the fractionalization indices and the AFDC/TANF payments are shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13 .
The only control variable Alesina and Glaeser (2004) use is the annual median income in each state. They find that if annual state median income rises by $100, monthly payment rises by almost $1.50 per month. Our results are very close to theirs. We find that if annual state income rises by $100, monthly payment rises by almost $1.
Conclusion
The root causes of income inequality continue to be among the most challenging questions in economics literature. In this study we analyze the direct and indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income inequality. When we use the polarization index as our measure of heterogeneity, we find a positive and linear relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and the Gini coefficient and a negative and linear relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and AFDC/TANF payments. When we use the fractionalization index as our measure of heterogeneity we find an inverse-U shaped relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and the Gini coefficient, and a Ushaped relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and AFDC/TANF payments.
5 While the estimated coefficients of EPI 2 are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications, the estimated coefficients of RPI 2 are not significant at all.
According to our estimations, ethnic and religious polarization explain almost 37% of the variation in the Gini coefficients across states (close to 75% when control variables are included) and almost 10% of the variation in AFDC/TANF payments (close to 65% when control variables are included). Similarly, fractionalization explains almost 40% of the variation in Gini coefficients (close to 80% when control variables are included) and almost 20% of the variation in AFDC/TANF payments (close to 65% when control variables are included).
The role of ethnic and religious groups within the distribution process increased (2001) argues, there is much to say about these efforts.
"They raise legal, moral, theological, and sociological questions, all of which deserve close attention" (Chaves 2001, 122) . This study clearly adds economic perspectives and questions to the other ones.
There are, of course many questions thrown up by our analysis and a number of pathways are opened for future research. It necessarily has shortcomings, not least those which are induced by data deficiencies. Nevertheless, the already conclusive nature of our early results
indicates that deeper analysis of this issue is worthwhile. Provided that the data are available, it will definitely be interesting for example to analyze the effects of heterogeneity on withingroup inequality as well as between-group inequality.
. 
